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1 
ARE PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGERS A ‘BUREAUCRATIC BURDEN’? THE CASE 
OF ENGLISH PUBLIC HOSPITALS 
 
ABSTRACT 
Although managers are, globally, a central part of the new public management reform 
agenda, in recent years policy makers, the media and the general public have raised concerns 
about their effectiveness and contribution. In some countries, notably the UK and the US, this 
debate has been heavily influenced by Public Choice Theory (PCT), which depicts 
‘bureaucrats’ as rent seeking, self-serving individuals. In this study, focusing on the case of 
acute care hospital trusts in the English National Health Service, we formally test whether 
public sector managers represent a ‘bureaucratic burden’. Using a longitudinal database 
spanning six years (2007-2012) and employing a dynamic panel data model, the findings 
reveal that, contrary to PCT assumptions, managers do not engage, in the main, in rent 
seeking behaviour and, crucially, appear to have a positive impact on organisational 
performance. Implications for theory, policy and practice are discussed.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
For over three decades, investments in managers and management have been central to the 
reform of public services around the world (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; Verbeeten and 
Speklé, 2015). While the latter emphasises the importance of management tools and 
techniques (Hood, 1995), the former involves ‘the creation of (new types of) managerial 
posts and positions’ in public sector organisations and the development of a ‘separate and 
distinct organisational function’ (Diefenbach, 2009; p. 894). In some cases, this has simply 
meant changing the job titles of senior administrators (or professionals). In others, it has 
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involved more substantive changes, asking traditional bureaucrats (turned ‘managers’) to 
embrace ‘private sector management wisdom’ (Meyer et al. 2014; p. 865) and actively 
recruiting managers from the commercial sector with different skill sets and motivations 
(Petrovsky, James and Boyne, 2015). Either way, the focus has been on strengthening the 
identity and resources of managers as a ‘distinct occupation’ (Grey, 1999) and on using 
business-like incentives (such as performance related pay) as a motivational tool (Weibel, 
Rost and Osterloh, 2009). 
However, this expansion in the numbers (and influence) of managers has not gone 
unchallenged. Historically, in both the UK and the US, policy makers have cast doubt on the 
contribution of managers, claiming that they soak up resources that might otherwise be used 
to improve front line services (Cohen and Brand, 1993). More recently, these concerns have 
grown against a backdrop of deepening financial pressures and distrust in government (Boyne 
and Meier, 2013). In some instances, this has led to a backlash against managers, with 
policies aimed at streamlining public organisations to reduce so-called ‘bureaucratic bloat’ 
(Boon and Wynen, 2017; Rutherford, 2016). In the UK National Health Service (NHS), for 
example, the former Secretary of State for Health Alan Milburn famously described 
managers as ‘men in grey suits’, pledging to reduce their number (Burgess and Currie, 2013). 
After 2010, the Coalition government also promised to reduce management overheads in the 
NHS by 45% in its planned reform of primary care. In the US, President Trump has made the 
reduction in size and cost of the federal government, including managers, one of the early 
objectives of his administration (Kettl, 2017).  
Unsurprisingly, these policies aimed at controlling the growth and remuneration of managers 
are often very popular, conforming to media stereotypes of managers as un-productive ‘fat 
cats’ (Kirkpatrick, Altanlar and Veronesi, 2017a). However, it is important to acknowledge 
that they also have deeper intellectual origins. Critical, in this regard, is ‘the extensive 
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acceptance of public choice reasoning and conclusions by…policy-relevant professions and 
some politicians’ (Dunleavy 1991; p. 3). Drawing from classical economic arguments, Public 
Choice Theory (PCT) (Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971) sees public officials (referred to 
generically as ‘bureaucrats’) as rational decision makers who act as self-interested, rent 
seeking individuals aiming to maximize their personal utilities (salary, perquisites of the 
office, power and so on) (Jacobsen, 2006). This behaviour, it is argued, will ultimately lead to 
the costly expansion of administrative hierarchies and sub-optimal outcomes for service 
users. According to Aucoin (1990), PCT-driven ideas, emphasising ‘distrust of the permanent 
bureaucracy’ (p. 121), have sat uncomfortably with the objectives of management reform. 
While the latter stresses the need to re-structure bureaucracy to ‘empower’ managers (Hood, 
1995), when looked at through the lens of PCT, managers themselves are also part of the 
problem. Implied here is that policy makers should make no distinction between managers 
and old-style bureaucrats, with the risks (and negative consequences) of rent seeking 
behaviour seen as applying equally to both (Aucoin, 2013).  
Despite their direct and indirect influence, to date, these PCT assumptions have not been 
formally tested in relation to managers. Of course, this is not to ignore studies that have 
explored the preferences of bureaucrats (more generally) with regard to spending on 
administration and outcomes for efficiency (Duncombe, Miner and Ruggiero, 1997). There 
has also been a parallel debate concerning the impact of ‘administrative intensity’. Drawing 
on ideas from contingency theory, this research looks at the antecedents and outcomes of 
administrative overheads in public organisations (Andrews and Boyne, 2014; Villadsen, 
2014). Yet, with some exceptions (Rutherford, 2016), this research has not focused explicitly 
on the impact of managers as a distinct occupation. In most studies, ‘managers’ are generally 
lumped together with other staff not directly involved with the provision of services 
(professionals and street-level bureaucrats) and, therefore, classified as part of the central 
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administrative function (Andrews, Boyne and Mostafa, 2017; Van Helden and Huijben, 
2014). The risk is that this approach does not distinguish sufficiently between administrators 
(in general) and managers as a relatively new occupation (in the public sector) with 
distinctive roles (Rutherford, 2016), skill sets and orientations (Diefenbach, 2009).  
Given these limitations, the aim of this paper is to provide a more explicit test of how far the 
assumptions of PCT apply to managers in public sector organisations. To do so, we seek to 
address two related questions. First, do managers engage in rent seeking behaviour? We 
explore this question in three ways, looking at whether a greater presence of managers in 
public sector organisations leads to an upward trend in management staff numbers (self-
reproduction), financial rewards (self-retribution) and increased job security (self-
preservation). Second, what impact does a larger management function have for 
performance? If the predictions of PCT are correct, we would expect managers to represent a 
‘bureaucratic burden’ (Boon and Verhoest, 2014), with largely negative implications for 
performance. But is this necessarily the case?  
To address these research questions, we focus on the empirical case of acute care hospital 
trusts in the English NHS. The NHS is theoretically interesting for two main reasons. First, it 
represents a public service where, historically, there has been a strong push to employ 
managers. This process began in 1983, following a review of the service by Sir Roy Griffiths, 
the CEO of a leading supermarket chain. After only a few months, Griffiths famously 
observed ‘…if Florence Nightingale were carrying her lamp through the corridors of the NHS 
today, she would almost certainly be searching for the people in charge’ (DHSS 1983; p. 12). 
In the aftermath of this report, the NHS began to recruit general managers to run hospitals 
and other services (The King's Fund, 2011), with their numbers rising steadily to around 
37,000 in 2012 (the last year used in this study).  
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A second reason for looking at the NHS is that, somehow paradoxically considering the drive 
to increase ‘management’ (noted above), it represents a service where governments have, 
more recently, expressed growing concern about the perceived risks of managers (Burgess 
and Currie, 2013). This has led to policies aimed at cutting management ‘overheads’ which 
are broadly consistent with the prescription of PCT to ‘reduce the total size of government 
bureaucracies’ (Aucoin, 1990; p. 122). Political concerns have also been fuelled by negative 
media headlines, such as ‘death by bureaucracy’, or ‘cure the NHS with fewer managers’, 
and by sceptical public opinion (Kirkpatrick et al., 2017a). A poll published in January 2015, 
for example, found that ‘too much being spent on management and bureaucracy’ ranked first 
amongst public concerns, ahead of (arguably more pressing) issues such as hospital closures, 
staff shortages and access to drugs and treatments (Lord Ashcroft KCMG, 2015).  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we outline some of 
the key ideas of PCT and, drawing on them, articulate five hypotheses relating to the likely 
behaviour and impact of managers in public sector organisations. We, then, describe our 
study, using a variety of administrative data sources over six years (2007-12) and present the 
main results of dynamic panel estimations. As we shall see, our findings do not offer 
compelling evidence to support the assumptions of PCT in relation to managers. In the 
concluding part of the paper, we explore some of the wider implications of this finding both 
for theory and policy. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Since its original formulation, PCT has had an important role in political debates in the 
western world. It has been actively embraced by a score of key intellectuals, pressure groups 
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and many politicians (Dunleavy, 1991), notably in the UK and the US (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2011). Ideas from PCT have influenced reforms aimed at the marketization of public 
services, including privatisation and outsourcing (Boyne, 1998). As we noted earlier, they 
have also – indirectly – shaped attitudes and policies regarding the structure and workforce 
composition of public sector organisations (Boon and Wynen, 2017; Rutherford, 2016). 
Specifically, PCT adopts a very sceptical view of the motivation and behaviour of public 
service officials (referred to as bureaucrats), including, by default, managers (Aucoin, 2013).  
Central to PCT is the idea that public service bureaucracies are associated with risks and 
moral hazards (Niskanen, 1971; Tullock, 1965; Weatherby, 1971). According to Niskanen 
(1971), in most instances the growth in public expenditure will far outweigh what is 
necessary or what is preferred by citizens, leading to an overproduction (or oversupply) of 
services. Ultimately, this arises from the rent seeking behaviour of public officials - 
bureaucrats - who engage in ‘empire building’ to maximise personal benefits (Jacobsen, 
2006). As Migué and Belanger (1974) put it: ‘the problem resides in bureaucrats enjoying 
rents at the expense of the consumer. The citizens have good grounds for holding bureaucrats 
in suspicion [sic!]’ (p. 34).  
This characterisation of the motives of bureaucrats is underpinned by classic economic theory 
and the view that humans are essentially rational decision makers (‘homo economicus’) 
(Kaboolian, 1998). The ‘rational actor’ model states that individuals have a set of well-
performed preferences and, as maximisers of benefits, are egoistic, self-regarding and 
instrumental in their behaviour (Dunleavy, 1991). According to Downs (1967), ‘every official 
is significantly motivated by his…own self-interest even when acting in a purely official 
capacity’ (p. 2), such that ‘the pressure on them to seek representative goals is much weaker’ 
(p. 223). The impact of this behaviour is also exacerbated by delegation and moral hazards 
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which arise from informational asymmetries between principals (governments and tax 
payers) and bureaucrats (Aucoin, 1990; 2013). 
Hence, at the core of PCT is the argument that bureaucrats will engage in rent seeking 
behaviour. However, there is less consensus within this approach over precisely what impact 
this will have. Some have pointed to the tendency for public officials to support increases in 
this overall size of government budgets (Blais and Dion, 1991; Garand, Parkhurst and Seoud, 
1991). By contrast, others employ more fine-grained distinctions between the overall budget 
(necessary to provide basic services) and discretionary or slack recourses (Migué et al., 1974; 
Niskanen, 1975). Bureaucrats, it is argued, will focus primarily on the latter (discretionary 
budgets) (Duncombe et al., 1997), which might be ‘used to purchase whatever non-
productive expenditures the bureaucrat desires’ (Wyckoff, 1990; p. 35). As such, the 
emphasis is on bureau-shaping activities, expanding the ‘core budget’ (consisting mainly of 
salaries and administrative overheads) rather than the wider ‘programme budget’ (which 
includes payments to other individuals and organizations) (Boyne, 1998; p. 698). As Egeberg 
(1995) also suggests, budget-maximisation efforts will impact mainly on policies that focus 
on the structure and staffing of government agencies. 
This drive to maximise (discretionary) budgets could have mixed implications depending on 
the goals of bureaucrats. Niskanen (1971) notes how public officials may be motivated by 
‘salary, perquisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage, output of the bureau, 
ease of making changes, and ease of managing the bureau’ (p. 38). However, most PCT 
accounts tend to emphasise two primary outcomes of budget maximisation: a) the further 
expansion in the number of administrators (bureau shaping); and, b) improved extrinsic 
rewards for bureaucrats themselves (such as pay and employment stability).  
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Regarding the first outcome, the predictions of PCT are very similar to those of Parkinson ’s 
Law concerning the self-aggrandizing nature of bureaucratic hierarchies (Parkinson and 
Osborn, 1957). As Downs (1967) suggests, ‘as the organisation grows, the proportion of all 
activity therein devoted to direct action declines, and the proportion devoted to internal 
administration rises’ (p. 141). Yet, while these tendencies are present in all organisations, 
they are assumed to be most pronounced in the public sector. This is because external forces 
(such as market demands for efficiency) play a less significant role in influencing staffing 
decisions, thus imposing fewer constraints on the self-interested behaviour of officials 
(Boyne and Meier, 2013). If a bureaucrat ‘does not have to pay the costs of adding more 
personnel, he will be motivated to increase the size of the organization indefinitely, since 
each new member adds somewhat to his total direct-action capabilities’ (Downs 1967; p. 
141).  
Hence, within PCT it is argued that attempts to maximise the budget will focus primarily on 
internal administration and lead ultimately to a growing number of bureaucrats (Tullock, 
2006). According to Niskanen (1971), this may occur even in situations where ‘some 
bureaucrats, by either predisposition or indoctrination…try to serve (their perception of) the 
public interest’, p. 39. In this context, bureaucrats may still regard an expansion in the 
number of staff as necessary to respond to targets set by policy makers or simply to cope with 
the challenges of managing complex organisations.  
In addition to this bureau shaping outcome, it is further assumed that bureaucrats will try to 
improve their own extrinsic rewards (Duncombe et al., 1997; Jacobsen, 2006). As the size of 
the budget grows, bureaucrats have greater ability to expropriate resources for their own 
salaries and other fringe benefits (perquisites), using the argument that greater responsibility 
(in managing larger organisations) justifies higher remuneration (Dunleavy, 1986). Bureau 
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expansion may improve career advancement and promotion prospects as well as access to 
training and development opportunities (Dunleavy, 1991). Senior officials will also be able to 
redistribute perquisites to other lower level bureaucrats (Niskanen, 1975). Because the latter 
are assumed to be equally motivated by financial rewards (Chen and Hsieh, 2015), it is 
assumed that they will not oppose these actions, thus further reinforcing the legitimacy of 
rent seeking behaviour by senior bureaucrats and their control over discretionary resources.  
Therefore, PCT encourages a cynical interpretation of the behaviour of public officials, 
which, as we suggested earlier has, more recently, been extended to managers. The latter is 
especially true in those countries where NPM reforms have led to the de-privileging of public 
service employment (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011), making it possible to recruit managers 
directly into the civil service. In these situations, where managers have become part of the 
permanent bureaucracy (Aucoin, 1990), PCT would predict very similar forms of rent 
seeking behaviour aimed at maximising (discretionary) budgets to enlarge and empower the 
management function itself. Specifically, this leads to what might be termed a ‘self-
reproduction’ hypothesis:  
H1: A higher proportion of managers-to-staff in public sector organisations 
will lead to a positive change in the number of managers in relation to staff. 
Similarly, PCT might further predict that any delegation of budgetary authority to managers 
will result in improved extrinsic rewards for managers that are largely unrelated to 
performance. These extrinsic rewards could take many forms, including pay, employment 
stability, related fringe benefits and access to resources such as training and development. 
However, in practice it is likely that in the public sector context, the most significant 
(extrinsic) rewards will be those associated with both higher salaries and enhanced 
employment stability (Chen and Hsieh, 2015; Lewis and Frank, 2002). This assumption is 
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also confirmed by comparative research focusing on public managers, which suggests that 
job security and pay are ranked highest (by managers) in most countries surveyed (Chen and 
Bozeman, 2013). As such, following the logic of PCT, it seems reasonable to develop two 
further hypotheses (what we term as ‘self-retribution’ and ‘self-preservation’ assumptions) 
concerning the likely impact of rent seeking behaviour with regard to the distribution of 
extrinsic rewards:  
H2: A higher proportion of managers-to-staff in public sector organisations 
will lead to an increase in management salaries. 
H3: A higher proportion of managers-to-staff in public sector organisations 
will lead to increased employment stability for managers.  
Building on these concerns, a further (critical) assumption of PCT is that the rent seeking 
behaviour of bureaucrats (and managers) will have largely negative implications for the 
performance of public sector organisations. Self-interested bureaucrats will grab a larger 
portion of the budget to use for their own benefit, thus starving organisations of resources 
needed to deliver core services (Boyne and Meier, 2013; Dunleavy, 1991). Due to 
asymmetric information, only bureaucrats know exactly at what costs their functions are 
carried out. Consequently, they are in the position of being able to expand budgets (or shape 
slack resources) to increase their own numbers and rewards beyond levels that are optimal for 
their organisation (Mueller, 2003). According to Downs (1967), bureaucratic growth also 
leads to the ‘ossification’ of public organisations and a reduced ability to respond to new 
circumstances. As such, in line with Parkinson’s Law, it is assumed that growing numbers of 
(over paid) administrators will place unnecessary burdens on public sector organisations 
(Duncombe et al., 1997; Migué et al., 1974). By the same token, it is argued that more 
streamlined (or flatter) organisations will perform better than ‘bloated’ ones because they are 
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more effective in channelling resources to protect the quality and quantity of core services 
(Ford and Slocum, 1977).  
Returning to the issue of managers, these assumptions lead us to predict that an expansion of 
‘unproductive’ (due to the related self-interested behaviours) management functions could be 
sub-optimal, pulling resources away from essential front line services and therefore 
increasing their cost (Rutherford, 2016). Specifically, it can be hypothesised that: 
H4: In public sector organisations, rent seeking behaviour of managers will 
be negatively related to organisational performance. 
However, it may be possible that increasing management numbers will only be negative for 
performance after a certain threshold level. This idea is acknowledged within PCT, which 
notes that, up to a certain point, bureaucrats may be needed to ensure the effective 
coordination of street-level staff (Andrews et al., 2017). According to Tullock (1965; p. 51), 
‘it seems clear that the declining “marginal efficiency” associated with increasing size would 
guarantee that a point would be attained at which further gains from expansion would be less 
than the added costs’. In this regard, a small increase in bureaucracy might be necessary to 
effectively distribute command and control tasks (Rutherford, 2016), with economies of scale 
helping to overcome the negative empire building tendencies described earlier. Nevertheless, 
it comes a point where ‘the balance shifts and organisations begin to suffer from 
“bureaucratic congestion”’ (Boyne and Meier, 2013; p. 309), and, so, diseconomies of scale 
are generated with negative impact, in particular on efficiency. Hence, when applied to 
managers, these insights lead to a final hypothesis which states that:  
H5: In public sector organisations the negative impact of rent seeking 
behaviour of managers on organisational performance will be non-linear.  
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
As noted, to test our main hypotheses, we focused on one part of the English public sector: 
the NHS. In contrast to the US and other insurance funded systems, the NHS is an entirely 
tax funded healthcare system with services free at the point of delivery regardless of ability to 
pay. Hospitals and other healthcare services are substantially part of the public sector with the 
vast majority of the clinical and non-clinical workforce employed directly by the state (as 
civil servants). 
Partly as a way of controlling spiralling costs, since the 1980s governments in the UK have 
sought to increase the number of general managers in the NHS as a means to develop 
management capabilities. This process went hand in hand with the re-structuring of the 
service to allow greater autonomy for hospitals (re-designated as ‘trusts’) and to stimulate 
competition through the development of internal markets (Battilana, 2011). However, as we 
noted earlier, more recently political support and enthusiasm for managers has greatly 
diminished. While the importance of ‘managing’ the NHS is still acknowledged, consistent 
with the assumptions of PCT, questions have been raised about the motives of managers, 
their high remuneration and value for money relative to alternative ways of using the same 
resource (such as investment in front line services).  
To investigate the validity of these concerns, we focused on one part of the NHS – acute care 
hospital trusts in England – where the vast majority of general managers are employed (The 
King's Fund, 2011). Our approach also draws heavily on publicly available secondary data 
relating to the characteristics of managers, the organisational context and various 
performance outcomes.  
Data sources 
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To test our hypotheses, we relied on a mix of official NHS statistics and a commercial 
database (Binley’s NHS Directory) supplied by the industry leader. Collected and published 
since 1991, the NHS Directory contains detailed information on NHS managers. A new 
updated edition is published every four months with the latest edition used in our study (64 - 
May 2012) comprising more than 30,000 individuals. This data is, in the first instance, 
gathered by the relevant NHS organisation and then double-checked by Binley’s analysts to 
correct any omissions or mistakes. In Binley’s, a managerial role is given to any individual 
with decision making power, specifically in relation to budgeting, financial management and 
allocation of resources (Kirkpatrick et al., 2017a). As such, the data captures both general (or 
‘pure play’) managers and ‘hybrid’ clinical managers (i.e. doctors and nurses’ managers with 
clinical directorates).  
To complement this resource, additional data was acquired through NHS Digital. This body 
hosts a number of publicly available repositories of information, including: the Hospital 
Episode Statistics database (offering data on the activity of trusts, such as patient admissions 
or their profile); the National Workforce Data Set (providing information on trusts’ 
workforce characteristics, including pay and turnover rates); the Hospital Estates and 
Facilities Statistics (providing a categorisation of trusts according to their location, legal 
status and main function); the NHS Bed Availability and Occupancy (offering data on beds 
numbers and usage); the Safety Data on Planned Care (containing information on the 
incidence of Clostridium difficile); the NHS Adult Inpatient Survey (gathering the views of 
patients and their carers on the service provided); and the NHS Reference Costs Data Set (a 
repository information used to establish prices for NHS-funded services in England).  
The cumulative database spanned six years (from 2007 to 2012) of information at the 
organisational level. It is important to note that, on average, for each year the sample 
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provided information for around 163 trusts, effectively the entire acute care trust population 
in England. However, missing data on the workforce characteristics related to pay and 
stability led to fewer observations in the regression analysis.  
Variables employed 
The main variable employed to test PCT assumptions was the size of the management 
function in hospital trusts, measured as the proportion of managers relative to all staff. This 
proxy was derived from two main sources. First, to identify ‘managers’ we relied on the 
classification contained in the Binley’s NHS Directory, including both clinical and non-
clinical (general manager) roles. Each management role listed by Binley’s was also doubled-
checked against the standard NHS occupation codes. Second, we used the Workforce 
National Data Set to calculate the total number of Full Time Equivalent (FTE) employees per 
hospital trust. In the NHS, the organisational workforce divides into a number of categories: 
doctors; qualified nursing; midwifery and health visiting staff; qualified scientific, therapeutic 
and technical staff; qualified ambulance staff; support to clinical staff; and, lastly, 
infrastructure support (comprising central functions, estate personnel, senior managers and 
managers). Because these statistics refer to the contracted (or established) workforce, they 
included those individuals who may have been temporarily absent (for instance on sick or 
maternity leave). Using these sources, we were able to determine the relative ‘manager-to-
staff ratio’ for trusts in the sample changes in this ratio over time.  
In order to test our second and third hypotheses in relation to rent seeking behaviour of 
managers and extrinsic rewards, two further variables were included. The first related to the 
monetary compensation (i.e. salary) of managers. This information was compiled from the 
section of the Workforce National Data Set related to the annual earnings of NHS staff 
broken down by job roles. Specifically, we focused on the annual earnings of ‘senior 
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managers’ and ‘managers’. Second, using the same source, we derived a measure of the 
contractual stability of managers. Here, we focused on the stability index used by the NHS to 
record turnover levels for senior managers and managers, as a proxy for stability of 
employment.  
With regard to the fourth hypothesis, to investigate the impact of these possible outcomes of 
rent seeking behaviour (growing numbers of managers and extrinsic rewards), we looked at 
three separate indicators of organisational performance. First, in keeping with the 
expectations of PCT, we focused on the efficiency of hospital trusts. As is customary in the 
healthcare literature, an efficiency score for each hospital trust was calculated using a non-
parametric linear programming method – Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) – that compares 
organisations by constructing a productivity production frontier (Hollingsworth and Smith, 
2003). The relative efficiency of each hospital trust is measured by its ability to increase 
(decrease) all of its outputs (inputs) given its inputs (outputs). Specifically, we used a radial 
input-oriented Constant Returns to Scale model where technical efficiency is captured by the 
ability of the organisation to use the minimum inputs for a given level of output. Following 
previous studies (Hollingsworth, 2008; Kohl, Schoenfelder, Fügener and Brunner, 2018), we 
employed capacity-related (number of beds and sites), labour-related (number of employees) 
and expenses-related (level of outsourcing of non-clinical services) inputs. The output 
indicators (including activity and quality outputs) comprised case-mix adjusted by 
admissions, day-cases, emergency admissions, and percentage of bed occupancy. We also 
included the Reference Cost Index (RCI), which records the average unit cost to the NHS of 
providing defined diagnosis and treatment services to NHS patients (Llewellyn and 
Northcott, 2005), and the patient mean waiting time on list for hospital treatments. The DEA 
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score1 for each hospital trust was, then, used as dependent variable in the regression 
estimations.  
Although the assumptions of PCT relate mainly to the efficiency of public sector 
organisations, in this study we also sought to capture broader measures of effectiveness. This 
is especially important in the healthcare context given the professionalised nature of services 
and value placed on maintaining and improving quality. By diverting finite resources 
(towards higher salaries or new appointments), rent seeking by managers could undermine 
quality outcomes. On the other hand, even if (contrary to the assumptions of PCT) managers 
do succeed in raising efficiency, this could also have a negative impact on service outcomes. 
The latter follows from the often reported trade off or tension between management goals of 
cost containment and service improvement (McKay and Deily, 2008; Stargardt, Schreyögg 
and Kondofersky, 2014). To explore these possibilities, we focused on two additional 
‘quality’ measures - patient experience and infection rate – both of which might, arguably, be 
impaired by any (rent seeking) tendency of managers to divert resources away from front line 
services.  
With regard to patient experience, we gathered data from the NHS Adult Inpatient Survey. 
This survey, run by the Care Quality Commission since 2001, collects the perceptions of 
NHS adult patients (16+ and excluding maternity patients, day cases and private patients) on 
a number of aspects such as being involved in decisions about their care and treatment, 
information sharing and support when leaving hospital, waiting times on so forth. We used 
the overall patient experience score for each hospital trust. Turning to control of outbreaks of 
infection, a measure of the quality of clinical processes, we concentrated on the rate of 
infection in hospital trusts for Clostridium difficile (C. difficile). This relates to a hospital-
                                                          
1 Analogous results were obtained when employing the radial Variable Returns to Scale model. These DEA 
scores are not reported but available on request. 
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acquired infection that affects people who have been treated with antibiotics, caused by a 
bacterium that can infect the bowel leading to diarrhoea. All incidents of C. difficile are self-
reported by hospital trusts. 
A number of control variables were introduced in the two stages of the regression analysis 
(see below). In relation to the rent seeking behaviour of managers (H1-3), our objective was 
to account for factors that might have an impact on their ability to maximise budgets and 
divert resources towards empire building. First, hospital trusts were categorised according to 
their legal status, whether they had obtained greater financial autonomy as independent 
Foundation Trusts (FT). FT status is only awarded to hospital trusts that formally apply and 
are judged to be higher than average performers across a range of indicators (Wright, 
Dempster, Keen, Allen and Hutchings, 2012). Because FTs (at least in theory) have greater 
autonomy and are financially solvent (often declaring a budget surplus) one might expect this 
to increase the opportunities for managers to engage in rent seeking behaviour. Second, we 
distinguished between hospital trusts in terms of their involvement in education (teaching and 
non-teaching hospitals). Here again the assumption was that rent seeking by managers would 
be greater in trusts with a stronger resource base such as teaching hospitals.  
As a third control, we accounted for the likely impact of organisational size - proxied by 
using the number of beds available for overnight patient stay (precisely the log-
transformation of the total number of beds). Larger organisations might provide greater 
opportunities for empire building by managers, for example making is easier to secure and 
justify resources for increasing salaries. Fourth, we considered the effect on the demand for 
care and treatment generated by the characteristics of patients admitted. Using the grouping 
of patient events in Healthcare Resource Groups2 (available from the National Case-mix 
                                                          
2 The Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs) are the English version of the Diagnose Related Groups used in 
many other healthcare systems including the U.S. HRGs represent the essential component of Payment by 
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Office), we derived a case-mix index dividing the case-mix value for each hospital trust by 
the mean of all case-mix values. This index aggregates information about patients and 
associated procedures based on the type and mix of patients treated. Consequently, a higher 
case-mix implies a more complex, resource intensive form of care (e.g. greater presence of 
patients with long term and/or multi-morbidity conditions), which we assumed would also 
lead to fewer opportunities for managers to engage in rent seeking. 
As a fifth control, we tried to account for the possible counter-veiling influence of 
professionals (notably doctors) within hospital trusts on resource allocation (Battilana, 2011). 
To explore this, we focused on clinical staff turnover (derived from the same workforce 
database mentioned above) as an indicator of the strength (or weakness) of cadres of 
professionals within trusts to mobilise rival claims to control discretionary budgets. Sixth, we 
took into account variations in the managerial rank amongst hospital trusts, based on the 
assumption that organisations with top-heavy management structures would be more likely to 
suffer from rent seeking behaviours. This variable was operationalised as a ratio between the 
number of managers operating at the strategic level, who have more direct control over 
allocation of resources (and so greater opportunity to divert them for personal benefits), and 
the total number of managers. Finally, we included dummies to control for years and hospital 
trust location, the latter by using the areas corresponding to the 10 Strategic Health 
Authorities (SHAs) still existing during the period under investigation. This list of controls 
was also used to frame the second set of tests, focusing on performance (H4-5)3.  
Empirical approach 
                                                          
Results, which is an activity based system used by the Department of Health to reimburse hospital trusts for 
patient stays, procedures and treatment offered.  
3 The proxies for organizational size (ln of beds) and operational complexity (case-mix) were excluded in the set 
of regressions for H4-5 to avoid issues of collinearity with the DEA scores, where they are employed as output 
indicators. Results were qualitatively similar when included in the estimations. 
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As noted, the analysis proceeded in two stages. The first set of tests examined H1-3 in 
relation to the extent of rent seeking behaviour of hospital trust managers. Specifically, we 
looked at the impact of manager-to-staff ratio on the percentage change in that ratio, pay 
levels of managers and employment stability over time. In the different specifications of the 
regression model, we also included previous levels of manager pay and stability in 
management numbers as controls. This was based on the assumption that changes in the 
manager-to-staff ratio might be conditional on the amount of discretionary budget available at 
an earlier period and that this, in turn, would be more limited in the case of a highly paid, 
stable management cadre. The second set of estimations investigated the impact of managers 
on organisational performance (H4-5). The high likelihood of a persistence of levels of 
hospital trust performance over time necessitated controlling for this (possible) path 
dependency with estimations that included lags of the dependent variables, as the 
hypothesised rent seeking behaviours could be affected by greater (lower) slack related to 
previous performance.  
Using time series cross-sectional (panel) data with hospital trust-year cases, we employed 
Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; 
Blundell and Bond, 1998) dynamic panel data estimator to overcome a number of challenges 
in the model specification. This system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator is 
an extension to the difference-GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). In the 
difference-GMM, equations are presented in terms of first differences eliminating the fixed 
effects (i.e. time-invariant trust characteristics), which is a problem if the time-series is highly 
persistent (Blundell and Bond, 2000). Thus, in the system-GMM regressions differences and 
levels form a system of equations. Whereas lagged levels are employed as instruments in the 
differenced equation, lagged differences are used as instruments in the level equation. 
Therefore, system-GMM allows to include time-invariant control variables (e.g. teaching 
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trust) into the model via the level equation. Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system-GMM 
estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) also controls for time-
varying unobserved effects as well as for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within 
hospital trusts. Furthermore, it works effectively with panels with small T (time dimension) 
and large N (cross-section dimension) and controls for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
of the errors within organisation-level observations. 
In addition to its suitability for dynamic left-hand-side variables (i.e. inclusion of lags of 
dependent variables as explanatory variables), the system-GMM estimator is appropriate for 
explanatory variables that are not strictly exogenous (i.e. correlated with past and current – 
endogenous - realisations of the error term). Accordingly, we treated all management related 
explanatory variables as fully endogenous in all sets of estimations. This helped to deal with 
the possibility that, say, past and current pay levels would have an impact on the size of the 
discretionary budgets (thus limiting the ability of managers to pursue empire-building 
strategies) or that the management related explanatory variables would be affected by past 
and current hospital trust performance levels. We also assumed that past and current hospital 
trust performance could impact on clinical staff stability levels and foundation trust status, as 
only trusts with a robust performance record – including those able to retain their clinical 
workforce - are allowed to become FTs. Hence, these two control variables were also treated 
as fully endogenous. On the other hand, teaching trust status, natural log of the number of 
beds, case-mix index, year and location dummies were all treated as strictly exogenous. All 
estimations were run with clustered robust standard errors at the hospital trust level. 
Robustness tests 
As the system-GMM approach can potentially underperform when the data employed is 
characterized by a relatively small number of clusters (<200) and persistent series, we utilised 
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an alternative dynamic panel data estimation technique, developed by Ahn and Schmidt 
(1995), which combines linear as well as additional nonlinear (quadratic) moment conditions. 
This estimator is asymptotically equivalent to the optimal minimum distance estimator of 
Chamberlain (1984). Following the assumption of serially uncorrelated idiosyncratic errors, 
these additional nonlinear moment conditions can yield potentially sizeable efficiency gains 
and they also improve the finite-sample performance. Importantly, the Ahn and Schmidt 
(1995) estimator relaxes a number of assumptions of the system-GMM estimator, e.g. mean 
stationarity. 
To further check the robustness of the system-GMM estimations, we ran a number of post-
estimation specification tests recommended by Blundell and Bond (1998) and Roodman 
(2009b): the Sargan-Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions to test the validity of the 
instruments; the Arellano and Bond (1991) test to over-rule a second-order serial correlation 
in the first-differenced residuals; and the Difference-in-Hansen test for the levels equation for 
both the full set of instruments and the subset based on the dependent variable. We also 
report the number of instruments generated for each regression to check the potential of 
‘instrument proliferation’. The latter occurs when too many instruments – defined as 
situations where instruments outnumber individual units in a panel (see Roodman (2009a)) – 
over-fit instrumented endogenous variables resulting in biased estimates (Roodman (2009b).  
 
RESULTS 
The descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 show that, on average, the proportion of 
managers-to-staff stood at roughly 2%. This figure is significantly lower than the 9.5% that is 
the average for the UK workforce as a whole (Kirkpatrick et al., 2017a) and, in itself, seems 
to disconfirm the perception of a bloated management cadre in the NHS (also see The King’s 
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Fund (2011)). The mean manager annual salary was around £53,000, although predictably 
this varied according to seniority. Average annual turnover for managers was roughly one in 
ten, with similar levels also applying to clinical staff. The year-on-year change in manager-
to-staff ratio was marginally negative, but considerable variations were observed between 
organisations. The percentage of top managers to all managers stood at around a third, but 
again there were some interesting variations between hospital trusts. In terms of 
organisational profile, FTs represented half of the sample, whereas teaching trusts made up 
17% of all organisations investigated. The average size of hospital trusts was roughly 800 
beds with a workforce of 3,900 full time equivalent staff (data not reported in the table).  
Insert Table 1 here 
In Table 2, we report the bivariate Pearson correlation matrix for all variables employed in 
the estimations. As can be seen, all the values were well within acceptable limits and, so, they 
did not generate any issue of possible multi-collinearity. To further mitigate the concern that 
regression coefficients would be increased due to collinearity, we also calculated the 
Variance Inflation Factors in each of the estimations. Again, all the relevant values fell 
comfortably within the acceptable threshold (<5).  
Insert Table 2 here 
Rent seeking behaviour 
Turning to our first three hypotheses, Table 3a reports the outcomes of the system-GMM 
estimations, with all three management proxies were treated as fully endogenous variables. 
Overall, the results here offered very limited support for the assumptions of PCT. First, we 
observe in relation to H1 that the previous year manager-to-staff ratio had a significantly 
negative impact on the change in the management cadre (p<0.10). Therefore, the prediction 
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that public sector managers will self-reproduce by pursuing empire building strategies is 
disconfirmed by our analysis, leading to a rejection of H1. In economic terms, this means that 
if the past period manager-to-staff ratio increased from 1.8% to 2.8% (i.e. a ‘one unit’ 
increase - essentially 1 SD), the change in manager-to-staff ratio would reduce by a sizeable 5 
percentage points (from -1.1% to around -6.7%). Furthermore, previous pay levels and 
stability in the management group did not appear to have any significant effect on the change 
in the manager-to-staff ratio.  
Second, the analysis reveals that higher levels of managers to hospital trust staff effectively 
led to higher managerial pay levels (p<0.05). As such, we found support for H2 related to 
self-retribution tendencies of public sector managers. Specifically, if past period manager-to-
staff ratio increased by ‘one unit’, manager pay would increase from around £52.8k to around 
£56.6k, or a 7-point increase in percentage terms. As expected, pay levels were also 
positively affected by previous high salary levels, in the sense that if salary levels for 
managers were already high, they were unlikely to decrease in subsequent periods. 
Conversely, lower turnover in managers did not appear to have a significantly negative 
influence on pay levels. Third, we did not find evidence to support the idea that higher past 
manager-to-staff ratios had any significant effect on the employment stability of managers. 
This leads us to reject H3.  
Turning to our main controls, as expected, the analysis showed that higher stability in 
clinician numbers (a proxy for professional influence) negatively impacted on the change in 
manager-to-staff ratio. FT status was also found to have a negative impact on the 
management-to-staff ratio. This is despite the opportunity that FT status (associated with 
greater formal autonomy) might afford managers to engage in self-serving behaviour by 
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exploiting slack resources. Furthermore, larger hospital trusts were more likely to offer higher 
financial rewards to their managers.  
Crucially, we obtained qualitatively very similar findings when using the alternative panel 
data estimator designed by Ahn and Schmidt (1995) (see Table 3b). Although the magnitude 
of the coefficients differed slightly, the supplementary analysis confirmed that the ratio-of-
managers had, respectively, a negative impact on changes in the same ratio, a positive effect 
on pay levels and no significant impact on managerial stability. As with the system GMM 
regressions, the other two proxies of managerial rent seeking did not have any statistically 
significant impact. Thus, the evidence gathered in relation to the first set of hypotheses about 
rent seeking behaviour is somehow mixed. While we find support for H2, regarding pay 
levels, the analysis leads us to reject H1 and H3. This is especially notable in the case of H1 
where we found that high manager-to-staff ratios in hospital trusts actually had a negative 
impact on rates of change in the size of management cadres.  
Insert Table 3a here 
Insert Table 3b here 
Impact on performance 
With reference to our second set of hypotheses (H4-5), we explored the PCT-derived 
assumption that public sector managers (through rent seeking behaviour) would divert 
valuable organisational resources for their own benefit and, in the process, negatively impact 
on overall performance. To explore this concern, two main tests were conducted: one looking 
at our key explanatory variables in isolation and a second looking at them in combination. 
The assumption here is that the three manifestations of rent seeking behaviour, in 
combination, would generate a kind of vicious cycle that exaggerates their negative impact on 
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the efficiency and effectiveness of hospital trusts. This analysis involved adding two and 
three-way interaction terms in the estimation models.  
Using Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond dynamic system-GMM panel estimations, we first 
investigated the separate impact of manager-to-staff ratios, pay and employment stability. As 
shown in Table 4a columns 1, 3 and 5, the analysis appeared to disconfirm the predictions of 
PCT (captured by H4). Specifically, the manager-to-staff ratio had a significantly (p<0.05) 
negative impact on the infection rate (thus, the infection rate decreases as the ratio of 
managers-to-staff increases). Additionally, this ratio was not significantly associated - at least 
linearly (see later H5) - with the DEA technical efficiency score of hospital trusts (meaning 
that a higher ratio does not lead to greater inefficiency), but positively affected overall levels 
of patient experience (p<0.05) (essentially, better experience was linked to higher proportion 
of managers to staff). With regard to the other two indicators of managerial rent seeking 
behaviour, (manager pay and employment stability), there was no significantly negative 
impact on any of the three performance outcomes – although stability did positively impact 
on patient experience. Interestingly, none of the (two and three-way) interaction tests between 
the proxies for managerial rent seeking behaviour revealed statistically significant 
associations, providing further evidence to contradict the assumptions of PCT (results not 
reported for the sake of simplicity and brevity).  
Importantly, as shown in Table 4b columns 1, 3 and 5, these findings were largely confirmed 
when employing Ahn and Schmidt (1995) estimator. The only exception here is that the 
impact of the manager-to-staff ratio and employment stability on patient experience was no 
longer significant, possibly due to higher level of persistence in the data. Although we need 
to exercise caution, this set of results appeared to disconfirm H4, suggesting that higher 
manager levels, pay and contractual stability are not having a negative impact on 
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performance. On the contrary, a higher proportion of managers to staff seemed to be 
associated with performance improvements for two out of three indicators (inflection rates 
and patient experience).  
In economic terms, for an average size hospital trust (employing 3,900 staff) a 1% growth in 
the managers-to-staff ratio would mean employing approximately 39 more managers at a 
basic gross salary cost of £2.06 million (given average salary of £52,830). According to our 
findings, if the manager-to-staff ratio increased from 1.8% to 2.8% (a ‘one unit’ increase - 1 
SD), the infection rate would decrease from around 0.87 to around 0.75. This represents a 
sizeable improvement of nearly 15 percentage points. In relation to patient experience, a ‘one 
unit’ increase in the proportion of managers to staff would generate a growth in the overall 
level of patient experience of around 0.5 points (up from the median value 75.4) – 
representing a moderate improvement of less than a percentage point.  
As far as the efficiency is concerned, an increase in the manager-to-staff ratio was not 
significantly associated with improvements (in terms of decreasing DEA scores). However, 
we did find evidence of a quadratic relationship between the main explanatory and the 
dependent variables, suggesting that increases in the manager-to-staff ratio might be positive 
up to a certain tipping point (see below in relation to for H5).  
Insert Table 4a here 
Insert Table 4b here 
Accordingly, the final set of results is related for our final hypothesis (H5) regarding the non-
linear relationship between managers rent seeking behaviour and performance. To briefly re-
cap, the prediction of PCT is that the performance consequences of managers will turn 
increasingly negative with higher numbers, salaries and employment stability. Due to 
27 
‘bureaucratic congestion’ (Boyne and Meier, 2013), a tipping point will be reached, after 
which the presence of managers becomes a growing problem. To test for this possibility, a 
quadratic term for manager-to-staff was introduced in the system-GMM regressions. This 
analysis produced mixed results.  
As can be seen in Table 4a, columns 2, 4 and 6, we found evidence of a non-linear 
relationship between manager-to-staff ratio and efficiency outcomes (proxied by the DEA 
scores). Specifically, looking at column 4, it can be observed that the management-to-staff 
ratio was significantly and positively associated with the DEA scores while its square value 
was significantly (at 5% confidence level) and negatively linked to efficiency levels. When 
running marginal effects analysis, it appeared that the tipping point for the positive impact of 
more managers in relation to staff hovered at around 3% (corresponding to the 90th percentile 
in the distribution). Before this threshold is met, a ‘one unit’ increase in the manager-to-staff 
ratio would lead to a growth in the DEA score of around 5% (or 0.05 units). Above that level, 
an increase in the manager-to-staff ratio did not have any significant impact on organisational 
efficiency but, interestingly, it never turned negative.  
Conversely, where infection rate and patient experience are concerned, the coefficient of the 
quadratic term was not statistically significant at the customary levels, negating the presence 
of a non-linear relationship. These findings were again largely confirmed when using the 
alternative panel data approach as indicated in Table 4b columns 2, 4 and 6. Hence, this 
analysis lends only partial support for H5. On the one hand, it suggests that the positive 
consequences of higher manager ratios steadily diminished with regard to organisational 
efficiency. Nevertheless, consistent with our findings in relation to H4, at no point did this 
relationship become negative, as predicted by PCT. Furthermore, it appeared to be linear (and 
positive) in relation to infection rate and patient experience.  
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With reference to the control variables, higher levels of clinical stability appeared to 
have a positive influence on the infection rate. Furthermore, FT status surprisingly 
did not have any effect on hospital trust efficiency as well as the other two indicators, 
with similar results observed in relation to teaching status. The only statistically 
significant result was associated with a top-heavy management structure, which 
appeared to lead to lower efficiency levels. As mentioned, in all sets of regressions 
we included years and location fixed effects. It is also worth pointing out that there 
was evidence of path-dependency in performance, as suggested by the size and 
significance of the coefficients of the first lags of the dependent variables. 
As reported in Tables 3 and 4, all tests undertaken confirmed the robustness of the findings, 
in relation to both the full set of instruments and the relevant subsets. Given that the number 
of instruments was comfortably below the total number of groups, we could also reasonably 
exclude the existence of a proliferation of instruments and, hence, of biased estimates due to 
overfitting of the endogenous variables. To further reinforce this conclusion, we followed the 
advice of Roodman (2009b) and proceeded to collapse the instruments. The system-GMM 
regressions run with a reduced number of instruments generated largely analogous results 
except for the coefficient of manager-to-staff ratio as predictor of patient experience, which 
was just outside the customary confidence level. No changes were noted in relation to the 
other two performance outcomes (efficiency and infection rates), including significance 
levels. Although not included in the main analysis, we also controlled for the effect of 
providers’ concentration (i.e. competition) by introducing in the estimations the Herfindahl 
Index (based on the number of admissions for each hospital trust in neighbouring areas). The 
results (which are available on request) remained unchanged.  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The main point of departure for this paper was the renewed academic and policy debate about 
managers in the public sector and their contribution. While NPM reforms globally have 
emphasised the need for more (and better trained) managers (Diefenbach, 2009), cash 
strapped governments have more recently begun to question this strategy, with managers 
finding themselves ‘in the eye of the storm’ (Boyne and Meier, 2013). We also noted how 
these policies have drawn implicitly on the assumptions of PCT about the rent seeking 
behaviour of bureaucrats (Jacobsen, 2006). However, while these ideas are influential, 
especially in Anglo-American policy contexts, it is not clear how far (if at all) they apply to 
the distinct occupation of public managers.  
Focusing on the illustrative case of the English NHS, a sector where over the past three 
decades there has been a marked drive to recruit managers, we found very little support for 
PCT arguments. Our results indicate that while a higher proportion of managers to staff does 
impact on salaries, it is not leading to a positive change in the growth of managers or in their 
employment stability. This is in stark contrast to the idea that managers, like bureaucrats, will 
engage in empire building activity by exploiting slack resources (Boyne and Meier, 2013; 
Kelman, 2006; Pandey, 2010). Nor did this analysis offer any support to the assumption that 
rent seeking behaviour of managers will have negative implications for performance. On the 
contrary, while caution needs to be exercised, higher manager-to-staff ratios in public 
hospitals appear to have a statistically significant positive impact on a range of performance 
outcomes (including the efficiency and effectiveness of services). 
These conclusions are strengthened by the quality of the data and the methodological 
approach chosen. Regarding the former, the study was able to combine a number of publicly 
available databases with a unique, proprietary dataset of NHS managers. This made it 
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possible to explore multiple performance indicators (efficiency and quality) and go beyond 
previous studies of ‘administrative intensity’ (Andrews and Boyne, 2011; Andrews et al., 
2017; Rutherford, 2016) by focusing not just on the relative size of management cadres but 
also on human resource management practices (pay and employment contracts). In addition, 
the longitudinal nature of these datasets allowed us to investigate the existence and 
subsequent impact of (assumed) management rent seeking behaviours over time. Turning to 
methods, the use of system-GMM estimations helped to limit the risks of reverse feedback 
loops between explanatory factors and outcome (dependent) variables. By treating relevant 
variables as fully endogenous, this method helps to deal with reciprocal influence between 
variables and, therefore, increases confidence in the assumed direction of causality. Our 
confidence in the findings was also reinforced by the robustness tests conducted, including 
the use of an alternative dynamic panel data estimator (Ahn and Schmidt, 1995). However, 
we cannot completely rule out the existence of some residual endogeneity concerns. 
The main findings reported here connect with a number of parallel strands of literature. On 
the one hand, they are broadly consistent with studies that have questioned PCT assumptions 
regarding the budget maximising tendencies of ‘bureaucrats’. Lewis (1990), for example, 
reports that that federal, state, and local public administrators are not more inclined than 
citizens to favour increases in government spending. Similarly, Dolan (2002) finds that 
federal administrators favour less spending than the general public on a broad number of 
spending categories. In this regard, our findings lend support to the idea that ‘bureaucrats’ 
(including managers) ‘do not have much to [personally] gain from growth in the public 
sector’ (Jacobsen 2006; p. 197). 
These results also chime with a growing body of research focusing on ‘administrative 
intensity’ in public organisations (Andrews and Boyne, 2014; Boon and Verhoest, 2014; 
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Boyne and Meier, 2013). Some studies from this perspective offer support for the 
assumptions of PCT, emphasising the bureaucratic burden of large administrative functions 
(including managers) (Bohte, 2001; Chubb and Moe, 1990; Chubb and Moe, 1988). 
However, although focusing on managers as opposed to (the broader category of) 
administrators, the NHS case appears to point in the opposite direction. Specifically, it 
suggests that larger management functions can, potentially, have generally positive 
consequences for performance (Andrews et al., 2017; Rutherford, 2016; Smith and Meier, 
1995). In this regard, our findings are broadly consistent with Andrews and Boyne (2011) 
conclusion that PCT claims regarding ‘excessive and extravagant’ administration in public 
organisations are often ‘misplaced’ (p. 906). 
These observations highlight a number of more specific contributions of our study, for theory 
research and policy. First, and most obviously, our results cast doubt on validity and 
usefulness of PCT as a theoretical framework specifically for explaining the behaviour and 
likely impact of managers. As we saw, in recent public debates PCT assumptions have been 
applied implicitly, making no distinction between managers as a discreet occupation and the 
great mass of career civil servants (or bureaucrats) (Aucoin, 2013). From this perspective, the 
risks associated with rent seeking and ‘bureaucratic bloat’ apply equally to all groups 
(Aucoin, 1990). And yet, what the NHS case appears to imply is that the behaviour and 
impact of managers is quite different to that which PCT assumes will apply to administrators 
in general. Instead of being ‘budget-maximizers’ (Dolan, 2002), public sector managers seem 
to behave more like budget-optimisers. Rather than generate a ‘bureaucratic burden’ (Boon 
and Verhoest, 2014), larger management functions in hospital trusts are, on balance, more 
likely to add value.  
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This conclusion, of course, raises wider questions about why public managers fail to conform 
to the predictions of PCT. Given the nature of our data it is possible only to speculate about 
this, although two possible explanations seem compelling. First, there are possible limits on 
the ability of managers to engage in rent seeking behaviour that arise from the altered context 
of public sector organisations. It might be argued that PCT assumptions concerning 
bureaucrats as relatively autonomous actors are less relevant in those organisations that have 
undergone NPM reforms and are subject to more systematic forms of control and oversight 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). While the emergence of performance management regimes and 
‘results oriented cultures’ (Verbeeten and Speklé, 2015; p. 955) in public organisations may 
not exclude all forms of opportunism by managers, they arguably limit the potential for this. 
In the NHS, for example, it is noted how ‘the increasingly exposed position that some 
hospital managers find themselves in appears to have encouraged behavior that is sometimes 
risk-averse’ (Anand et al. 2012; p. 215). If anything, this risk aversion will be exaggerated by 
the fact that managers themselves have formal roles as accountable agents in the policing and 
overseeing of these new control regimes (Diefenbach, 2009).  
Second, it might be argued that PCT largely ignores the productive potential of managers. 
This is in contrast to a wider body of literature focusing on management policies and 
practices in public sector organisations (Favero, Meier and O’Toole Jr, 2014; Meier and 
O'Toole Jr, 2011; Meier, O'Toole Jr, Boyne and Walker, 2006; O'Toole Jr and Meier, 1999; 
Walker, 2013). Meier et al. (2006), for example, find that management is a ‘critical 
contributor’ to improved organisational performance, while Meier and O’Toole Jr (2002) 
shows that ‘managerial quality’, measured in terms of additional salary paid, is positively 
associated with the performance of Texas School districts. 
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These conclusions also have policy implications, raising questions about the usefulness of 
PCT ideas as a way of framing policies relating to the workforce re-structuring of public 
organisations. Specifically, our study suggests that policies aimed at downsizing managers to 
‘trim the fat’ (Cohen and Brand, 1993) or reduce so called bureaucratic bloat are potentially 
misguided. While they may offer (short term) savings in terms of salary costs, by 
undermining the productive potential of managers, they could, in the longer term, be 
counterproductive for performance. These concerns are especially important in complex 
services such as healthcare, where managers are frequently viewed (incorrectly) as a largely 
unnecessary imposition on work of front line clinicians (Battilana, 2011; Glouberman and 
Mintzberg, 2001). In a speech to the NHS Annual Conference in December 2016, for 
example, the UK Minister of Health, Jeremy Hunt declared: ‘…we should today ask whether 
the NHS made a historic mistake in the 1980s by deliberately creating a manager class who 
were not clinicians’. This, of course, is not to ignore the relationship between incompetent 
management practice and performance failure in some NHS organisations (see for example 
the Francis Report (2013)). Rather, it is to emphasise the overall net positive contribution that 
managers appear to make.  
When drawing these conclusions, it is, obviously, important to note certain caveats and 
avenues for future research. First, more work is needed to understand why, against the 
expectations of many, larger management functions are contributing to performance. Here, it 
would be useful to investigate the impact of managers focusing on their ability, motivation 
and opportunity (Appelbaum, 2000). Concerning ability, the distinctive human capital of 
(some) managers may directly contribute to improved resource allocation (Kirkpatrick, 
Vallascas and Veronesi, 2017b) or better planning and ‘internal synchronization’ (Van 
Helden and Huijben, 2014). The motivation of managers to focus on the organisational 
performance goals may also be significant, especially when coupled with incentive policies 
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such as performance related pay (Weibel et al., 2009). Related to this is the possibility that 
managers have developed a strong public service ethos and that this, too, has impacted on 
their behaviour (see Perry (2000)). The latter is strongly suggested by Meyer et al. (2014), 
who note how managerial logics can often coexist with the traditional ethos of public 
services. Lastly, managers potentially have greater opportunities to contribute to performance 
goals, especially in organisations that have undergone corporatization and where (formal) 
autonomy to make decisions has increased (Lindlbauer, Winter and Schreyögg, 2015).   
Second, we have concentrated on one specific public service - the healthcare sector - and one 
type of service provider – acute care hospitals - in a country (the UK) at the forefront of 
public management reforms. This raises obvious questions about the representativeness of 
our sectoral study. The absence of any negative impact of managers on performance even at 
higher levels (H5) may be explained by the organisational complexity of health services, 
which, arguably, require more managers to ensure co-ordination (Andrews and Boyne, 2014). 
However, is this also true of public services such as education, police or fire services which 
pose quite different demands? Furthermore, the data does not allow us to investigate the 
effect of hidden management-type work undertaken by other employees (especially 
clinicians) who take on leadership roles without formal managerial duties.  
Lastly, more work is needed to assess the opportunity costs associated with managers and the 
benefits of recruiting more of them relative to investments in other areas (such as frontline 
services). This is especially important for cash strapped public organisations forced to make 
(increasingly) tough choices about resource allocation under the media spotlight. While 
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Variable Definition N. Mean Median Min Max St.Dev. 
Infection Rate  Count of C.difficile infections adjusted by total number of admissions 773 1.21 0.87 0.00 8.18 1.03 
DEA Efficiency Score  Technical efficiency score based on input-oriented CRS model 961 0.89 0.93 0.28 1.00 0.12 
Patient Experience  Overall patient experience score 941 75.71 75.40 66.80 87.80 3.46 
Change in Manager-to-Staff Change in annual % of manager-to-staff 806 -0.14 -1.10 -70.94 216.58 17.01 
Manager-to-Staff Ratio Total number of managers over total number of FTE employees 978 2.01 1.78 0.51 11.35 1.11 
Manager Pay (000s) Management earnings in £ 606 52.83 52.24 37.95 94.79 7.35 
Manager Stability  Managers stability index expressed in % 634 87.54 88.49 55.05 100.00 6.52 
Top Managers % of manager in senior executive roles to total number of managers 978 27.31 26.76 9.68 55.56 6.69 
Clinical Stability Clinicians stability index expressed in % 634 91.76 92.13 80.53 96.53 2.22 
Foundation Trust Dummy variable for FT status 978 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 
Teaching Trust Dummy variable for teaching status 978 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.37 
Ln Beds Natural log of total number of beds 978 6.51 6.60 3.14 7.99 0.68 




Bivariate Pearson correlation matrix  
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1-Infection Rate 1             
2-DEA Efficiency Score -0.148* 1            
3-Patient Experience -0.113* 0.019 1           
4-Change in Manager-to-Staff -0.048 0.006 -0.016 1          
5-Manager-to-Staff Ratio -0.071* 0.238* 0.378* 0.136* 1         
6-Manager Pay (000s) -0.224* -0.001 -0.175* -0.067 -0.185* 1        
7-Manager Stability 0.004 -0.080* 0.023 0.033 -0.201* -0.148* 1       
8-Top Managers -0.068 0.138* 0.172* -0.139* 0.319* 0.118* -0.161* 1      
9-Clinical Stability -0.039 0.063 0.173* -0.090* -0.103* -0.165* 0.254* -0.095* 1     
10-Ln Beds 0.144* -0.262* -0.380* 0.062 -0.736* 0.095* 0.222* -0.585* 0.127* 1    
11-Case mix Index -0.327* 0.151* 0.184* 0.024 0.117* 0.275* -0.033 0.052 0.006 -0.155* 1   
12-Foundation Trust -0.158* 0.090* 0.356* -0.053 0.061 -0.032 0.097* 0.081* 0.128* -0.129* 0.144* 1  
13-Teaching Trust  0.125* -0.305* -0.046 0.030 -0.321* 0.148* 0.055 -0.281* -0.055 0.425* 0.037 0.055 1 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)     2.76 1.27 1.15 1.60 1.13 3.98 1.19 1.09 1.34 




Coefficients for System-GMM estimations: H1-3 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Dependent Variable 
 Change in Manager-to-Staff Ratio Manager Pay (000s) Manager Stability 
First lag of the dependent variable -0.217***[0.054] 0.748***[0.206] 0.046     [0.097] 
Past period Manager-to-Staff Ratio -5.569*    [3.108] 4.372**  [2.090] -1.884     [1.263] 
Past period Manager Pay (000s) 0.156      [0.353]  -0.163     [0.186] 
Manager Stability -0.020      [0.396] -0.009      [0.102]  
Clinical Stability -4.077***[1.592] -0.174      [0.441] -0.396     [0.511] 
Top Managers -0.608      [0.451] -0.003      [0.016] -0.013     [0.225] 
Foundation Trust -3.372*    [1.851] 0.575      [0.834] 0.805     [0.737] 
Teaching Trust -0.140      [2.367] 0.480      [0.900] -0.712     [0.973] 
Ln Beds -5.658      [4.226] 0.545*    [0.316] 0.279     [2.049] 
Case-mix Index 0.369      [0.490] -0.007      [0.015] 0.236     [0.261] 
Year Dummies YES YES YES 
SHA Dummies YES YES YES 
Observations 451 446 452 
Number of groups 155 153 155 
Number of instruments 54 49 46 
Hansen testa (chi2) 23.30 (0.76) 24.90 (0.47) 20.24 (0.57) 
Ar(2)b (z) 1.02 (0.15) 0.50 (0.32) 0.24 (0.41) 
Diff-in-Hansen testc (chi2)     
full set  16.68 (0.34) 17.60 (0.17) 13.69 (0.25) 
subset  3.55 (0.62) 6.76 (0.15) 1.29 (0.73) 
Wald (chi2) 124*** 612*** 76*** 
Notes: Clustered robust standard errors at the hospital trust level are in brackets. All estimations include a constant, year 
dummies and Strategic Health Authority (SHA) dummies, which are not reported due to space reasons. aIn the Hansen 
test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments as a group are exogenous. bIn the Arellano-Bond test, the null hypothesis 
is that the errors in the first-difference equation do not have second-order serial correlation. cIn the Difference-in-Hansen 
test, the null hypothesis is that the instrument subset is exogenous. Difference-in-Hansen test statistics are presented for 
the levels equation for both the full set of instruments and the subset based on the dependent variables. P-values are in 
parentheses for Hansen, Arellano-Bond and Difference-in-Hansen tests. Significance at * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 3b 
Coefficients for Ahn and Schmidt (1995) estimations: H1-3 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Dependent Variable 
 Change in Manager-to-Staff Ratio Manager Pay (000s) Manager Stability 
First lag of the dependent variable -0.247*    [0.147] 0.574***[0.201] -0.010     [0.124] 
Past period Manager-to-Staff Ratio -5.298***[1.910] 3.342*    [2.005] -2.593     [2.203] 
Past period Manager Pay (000s) -0.298      [0.434]  0.023     [0.337] 
Manager Stability 0.286      [0.364] -0.213      [0.140]  
Clinical Stability -2.779***[1.057] -0.789      [0.504] -0.231     [0.627] 
Top Managers 0.473      [0.322] 0.324**  [0.159] -0.087     [0.310] 
Foundation Trust -3.362*    [1.916] 0.546      [0.777] 0.514     [0.779] 
Teaching Trust 0.638      [2.278] 0.328      [0.949] -0.846     [1.064] 
Ln Beds 0.816      [3.394] 0.729**  [0.297] -1.261     [2.874] 
Case-mix Index 0.487      [0.479] -0.014      [0.193] 0.255     [0.308] 
Year Dummies YES YES YES 
SHA Dummies YES YES YES 
Observations 451 446 452 
Number of groups 155 153 155 
Notes: Clustered robust standard errors at the hospital trust level are in brackets. All estimations include a constant, year 
dummies and Strategic Health Authority (SHA) dummies, which are not reported due to space reasons. Significance at 







Coefficients for System-GMM estimations: H4-5 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Dependent Variable 
 Infection Rate DEA Efficiency Score Patient Experience 
First lag of the dependent variable 0.385***[0.055] 0.407***[0.046] 0.529***[0.088] 0.519***[0.089] 0.466***[0.084] 0.465***[0.080] 
Manager-to-Staff Ratio -0.123**  [0.053] -0.020      [0.083] 0.010      [0.012] 0.051***[0.017] 0.531**  [0.215] 0.806**  [0.382] 
Manager Pay (000s) -0.002      [0.005] -0.003      [0.004] 0.000      [0.001] 0.000      [0.001] -0.011      [0.032] -0.004      [0.032] 
Manager Stability -0.002      [0.007] -0.001      [0.006] -0.000      [0.002] 0.000      [0.002] 0.115***[0.031] 0.104***[0.027] 
Manager-to-Staff Ratio2  -0.002      [0.008]  -0.004**  [0.002]  -0.030      [0.042] 
Clinical Stability -0.060**  [0.029] -0.048**  [0.022] -0.006      [0.005] -0.006      [0.005] -0.231      [0.145] -0.200      [0.125] 
Top Managers 0.006      [0.007] 0.003      [0.006] 0.002*    [0.001] 0.002*    [0.001] 0.038      [0.037] 0.036      [0.036] 
Foundation Trust -0.023      [0.077] -0.022      [0.068] 0.018      [0.014] 0.014      [0.015] 0.028      [0.376] -0.039      [0.365] 
Teaching Trust 0.002      [0.070] 0.064      [0.061] -0.020      [0.018] -0.002      [0.017] 0.434      [0.300] 0.567*    [0.324] 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
SHA Dummies  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 590 590 589 589 581 581 
Number of groups 153 153 157 157 154 154 
Number of instruments 77 90 81 94 81 94 
Hansen testa (chi2) 65.93 (0.13) 75.81 (0.19) 68.84 (0.16) 76.17 (0.29) 45.20 (0.87) 61.99 (0.71) 
Ar(2)b (z) -0.41 (0.68) -0.55 (0.59) -1.63 (0.10) -1.48 (0.14) 0.91 (0.36) 0.86 (0.39) 
Diff-in-Hansen testc (chi2)       
full set 41.47 (0.15) 46.13 (0.27) 46.59 (0.11) 50.97 (0.22) 23.01 (0.94) 30.69 (0.92) 
subset 13.77 (0.32) 18.53 (0.24) 14.29 (0.35) 21.64 (0.16) 8.87 (0.71) 10.49 (0.79) 
Wald (chi2) 6019*** 7384*** 75311*** 67333*** 1310*** 537*** 
Notes: Clustered robust standard errors at the hospital trust level are in brackets. All estimations include a constant, year dummies and Strategic Health Authority 
(SHA) dummies, which are not reported due to space reasons. aIn the Hansen test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments as a group are exogenous. bIn the 
Arellano-Bond test, the null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference equation do not have second-order serial correlation. cIn the Difference-in-
Hansen test, the null hypothesis is that the instrument subset is exogenous. Difference-in-Hansen test statistics are presented for the levels equation for both 
the full set of instruments and the subset based on the dependent variables. Estimations (5) and (6) also include second lag (not reported) of the dependent 
variable to obtain satisfactory Arellano-Bond test results, i.e. not rejecting the null of the errors not having second-order serial correlation. P-values are in 




Coefficients for Ahn and Schmidt (1995) estimations: H4-5 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Dependent Variable 
 Infection Rate DEA Efficiency Score Patient Experience 
First lag of the dependent variable 0.337***[0.051] 0.341***[0.049] 0.451***[0.134] 0.345***[0.121] 0.101      [0.132] 0.103      [0.124] 
Manager-to-Staff Ratio -0.197***[0.070] -0.081      [0.177] 0.002      [0.023] 0.129**  [0.061] 0.124      [0.455] 0.828      [1.348] 
Manager Pay (000s) -0.000      [0.001] -0.000      [0.001] 0.002      [0.002] 0.003      [0.002] -0.048      [0.032] -0.041      [0.032] 
Manager Stability -0.004      [0.004] -0.004      [0.004] 0.001      [0.001] 0.001      [0.001] 0.026      [0.020] 0.021      [0.019] 
Manager-to-Staff Ratio2  -0.011      [0.021]  -0.015**  [0.007]  -0.083      [0.191] 
Clinical Stability -0.043**  [0.018] -0.046**  [0.020] -0.006      [0.004] -0.002      [0.003] -0.043      [0.082] -0.038      [0.081] 
Top Managers -0.006      [0.008] -0.010      [0.008] 0.002      [0.003] 0.003      [0.003] -0.009      [0.028] -0.000      [0.037] 
Foundation Trust -0.045      [0.204] -0.046      [0.184] 0.031      [0.059] 0.020      [0.052] 0.189      [0.775] 0.084      [0.886] 
Teaching Trust 0.077      [0.073] 0.093      [0.073] -0.043      [0.033] 0.012      [0.044] 0.242      [0.537] 0.580      [0.775] 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
SHA Dummies  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 590 590 589 589 584 584 
Number of groups 153 153 157 157 154 154 
Notes: Clustered robust standard errors at the hospital trust level are in brackets. All estimations include a constant, year dummies and Strategic Health Authority 






Simar and Wilson (2007) Efficiency Analysis (All Years) 
 
 (1) (2) 
Variable DEA Efficiency Score 
Manager-to-Staff Ratio 0.043***[0.015] 0.171***[0.053] 
Manager Pay (000s) 0.001      [0.001] 0.002      [0.001] 
Manager Stability -0.003      [0.002] -0.002      [0.002] 
Manager-to-Staff Ratio2  -0.028***[0.011] 
Clinical Stability 0.004      [0.005] 0.004      [0.005] 
Top Managers 0.004**  [0.002] 0.005***[0.002] 
Foundation Trust 0.007      [0.018] 0.001      [0.018] 
Teaching Trust -0.087***[0.023] -0.065***[0.024] 
Year Dummies YES YES 
SHA Dummies  YES YES 
Observations 398 398 
Number of efficient DMUs 198 198 
Wald (chi2) 78.95*** 82.72*** 
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors at the hospital trust level are in 
brackets. All estimations include a constant, year dummies and 
Strategic Health Authority (SHA) dummies, which are not reported 
due to space reasons. Significance at * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
